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    <title>Web-Components on CSP Guide</title>
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      <title>CSP and Web Components: Shadow DOM Security Tradeoffs</title>
      <link>https://csp-guide.com/posts/csp-and-web-components-shadow-dom-security-implications/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Content Security Policy and Web Components solve very different problems, but they collide in ways that matter a lot when you ship component-heavy frontend code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CSP is your browser-enforced damage control layer. Web Components are your encapsulation and reuse layer. Shadow DOM sits in the middle, and people routinely give it more security credit than it deserves.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My blunt take: Shadow DOM is great for isolation of markup and styles. It is not a security boundary. CSP is a real security control. If you treat Shadow DOM like a sandbox, you will eventually ship an XSS bug with a false sense of safety.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      
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